contend with whether such taxation is compatible with existing international tax rules and in particular with the bilateral tax treaty network. Indeed, some researchers have argued that the separate accounting (SA) method and the arm's length standard are so embodied in the treaties that they form part of customary international law and are binding even in the absence of a treaty. In this paper we will argue that UT can be compatible with most of the existing tax treaties, and that developing countries in particular can implement it in most cases with or without a tax treaty.
1. UT and the Existing Treaty Network.
1 Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan 2 LLM in International Tax, the University of Michigan (2013).
Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of the treaties, which assumes the SA method because it addresses the commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises.
3 If UT were adopted, Article 9 would become irrelevant in those situations to which UT applies (i.e., where a unitary business is found to exist)
because UT ignores the transactions between related parties, and treats them instead as part of a single enterprise.
Instead, UT would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7), " [t] he fact that a company that is a resident of a Contracting State controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of the other Contracting State … shall not of itself constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other." However, it is well established that a dependent agent can be a permanent establishment (see Art.
5(5)), and whether an agent is dependent is based on whether the principal exercises legal and economic control over the agent. 4 "An agent that is subject to detailed instructions regarding the conduct of its operations or comprehensive control by the enterprise is not legally independent." 5
In the case of a modern, integrated MNE that operates as a unitary business, a strong argument can be made in most cases that the parent of the MNE exercises both legal and economic control over the operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the subsidiaries bear no real risk of loss and acquire goods and services exclusively or near exclusively from the parent or other related corporations. The existence of Intranets in most MNEs has resulted in most important operational decisions being centralized. In that case, the subsidiaries should be regarded as dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding is in fact made with increasing frequency in both developed and developing countries. 6 If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Art. 7(2) of the treaties requires the attribution of the same profits to the subsidiary "that it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions." Arguably, the application of UT satisfies this arm's length condition because in the absence of precise comparables (which almost never exist) it is not possible to determine exactly what profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary under SA.
When the US adopted CPM and profit split in the 1994 transfer pricing regulations, some countries objected that it was violating the treaties because these methods did not rely on exact comparables to find the arm's length price. However, these objections soon subsided, and even the OECD endorsed similar methods in its transfer pricing guidelines. The US has always maintained that both CPM and profit split satisfy the arm's length standard despite the lack of precise comparables (and in the case of profit split, using no comparables at all to allocate any residual profits). Similarly, the US has maintained that the "super-royalty rule" of IRC sec. 482 (which requires royalties to be "commensurate with the income" from an intangible, and therefore subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent with the arm's length standard, even though no comparables can be found to show that such adjustments are ever made by unrelated parties.
Before the recent changes to the OECD MC, it was therefore quite plausible to argue that UT was compatible with the treaties if the subsidiary were as a factual matter legally or economically dependent on the parent so as to constitute a PE. In addition, a country that wished to adopt UT could rely on the language of the OECD MC Art.
7(4):
"Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise to its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be necessary; the method of apportionment adopted shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the principles contained in this Article."
Since it can be argued that in the absence of comparables the result reached under UT is equivalent to what could be reached under SA, this language seems to permit the use of UT for dependent agent PEs.
However, the OECD in 2010 adopted changes to article 7 that may make this argument more difficult to sustain. Specifically, the OECD has adopted the "authorized OECD approach" to the attribution of profits to PE that treats them as the equivalent to subsidiaries, and has suggested that the transfer pricing guidelines that explicitly reject UT should be applied to PEs. In addition, the OECD has followed the US lead and deleted article 7(4) from its MC. However, the UN model still includes article 7(4). Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" New Zealand Oct. 17, 1986 Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Singapore Jan. 24, 1994
Art. 30 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Israel Jan. 26, 1996
Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Lithuania July 26, 2011
Art. 31 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Art. 32 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Mozambique
Sept. 30, 2010
Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Namibia Feb. 15, 1997
Nepal
Nov. 27, 2011
Oman April 2, 1997
Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Feb. 12, 1990 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Philippines
Taiwan July 12, 2011
Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Feb. 8, 2006 Art. 30 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Serbia & Montenegro
Sri Lanka Jan. 27, 1982 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Sweden June 7, 1988 Art. 30 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Syria
June 18, 2008
Tanzania
May 27, 2011
Art. 31 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Mar. 22, 1985 Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Thailand
United Kingdom Jan. 25, 1993 Art. 30 "…nothing in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be necessary …"
Ukraine April 7, 1999 Art. 30 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Vietnam Sept. 7, 1994 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
INDONESIA & Netherlands Mar. 5, 1973 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Art. 25 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Iran
April 30, 2004
Art. 27 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Japan Mar. 3, 1982 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Kuwait
April 23, 1997
Mauritius
Dec. 10, 1996
Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
New Zealand
Mar. 25, 1987
Art. 27 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Philippines
June 18, 1981
Poland Oct. 6, 1992
Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Slovakia Oct. 12, 2000
Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Syria June 7, 1997
Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Mar. 25, 1981 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Thailand

Tunisia
May 13, 1992
United Arab Emirates
Nov. 30, 1995
United Kingdom April 5, 1993
Ukraine
April 11, 1996
Venezuela
Feb. 27, 1997
Vietnam
Dec. 22, 1997
Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" May 30, 2001 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Feb. 21, 2000 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Zimbabwe
Syria
Mexico Oct. 16, 1994 Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Malta
Mar. 25, 1997
Romania Oct. 11, 1993 Art. 30 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Sri Lanka
May 28, 1984
Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Feb. 12, 1980 Art. 26 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Switzerland
Singapore Nov. 9, 1994
Art. 26 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
United Kingdom June 2, 1994
Norway
Mar. 23, 1995
Poland
Nov. 30, 1998
Portugal
Nov. 11, 1999
Romania July 20, 2000
Slovakia
May 13, 2006
Spain July 24, 1992
Sweden
Sept. 21, 1992
Ukraine Jan. 23, 2012
Art. 30 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Venezuela Feb. 6, 1997 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
MOROCCO & Pakistan
May 18, 2006
Poland Oct. 24, 1994 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Portugal
Sept. 29, 1997
Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Sept. 11, 1981 Art. 27 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Romania
Singapore Jan. 9, 2007 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Switzerland
Mar. 31, 1993
Ukraine July 13, 2007
NETHERLANDS& Norway
Nov. 13, 1989
New Zealand Oct. 15, 1980 Art. 27 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
South Africa
Mar. 15, 1971
Slovakia Mar. 4, 1974 Art. 31 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Venezuela
May 29, 1991
Pakistan
Mar. 24, 1982
Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Panama Oct. 6, 2010
Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Sept. 20, 1979 Art. 30 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Sept. 20, 1999 Art. 32 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Poland
Portugal
Art. 30 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Feb. 27, 2001 Art. 27 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Taiwan
Romania Mar.5, 1998
Saudi Arabia Oct. 13, 2008 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Slovenia
June 30, 2004
Sri Lanka
Nov. 17, 1982
United Arab Emirates
May 8, 2007
Venezuela
Vietnam Jan. 24, 1995
Art. 30 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Dec. 19, 1977 Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Zambia
Zimbabwe
May 18, 1989
PHILIPPINES&
Poland Sept. 9, 1992 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Dec. 14, 2008 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Qatar
Romania
May 18, 1994
Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" April 26, 1995 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Russia
Singapore Aug.1, 1997
ROMANIA& San Marino
May 23, 2007
Switzerland Oct. 25, 1993 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Qatar Oct. 24, 1999 Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Yugoslavia
May 16, 1996
Art. 30 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Sept. 27, 1993 Art. 30 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Switzerland Nov. 15, 1995 Art. 27 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Russia
RUSSIA&
Yugoslavia Oct. 12, 1995 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Nov. 29, 1995 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Sri Lanka Mar. 2, 1999 Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Slovenia
Syria
Sept. 17, 2000
Thailand
Sept. 23, 1999
Vietnam
May 27, 1993
April 10, 2010
Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Although this paragraph is not included in the U.S. Model, this is not a substantive difference because the result provided by paragraph 4 is consistent with the rest of Article 7. The U.S. view is that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 authorize the use of total profits methods independently of paragraph 4 of Article 7 of the OECD Model because total profits methods are acceptable methods for determining the arm's length profits of affiliated enterprises under Article 9. Accordingly, it is understood that, under paragraph 2 of the Convention, it is permissible to use methods other than separate accounting to estimate the arm's length profits of a permanent establishment where it is necessary to do so for practical reasons, such as when the affairs of the permanent establishment are so closely bound up with those of the head office that it would be impossible to disentangle them on any strict basis of accounts. Feb. 23, 1983 Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
SERBIA &
Sweden
Switzerland Jan. 11, 1983 Art. 27 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Thailand
Dec. 14, 1988
United Arab Emirates
Sept. 24, 2003
United Kingdom
June 21, 1979
Vietnam Oct. 26, 2005 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
SUDAN & United Arab Emirates
Mar. 18, 2001
SWEDEN & Tanzania May 2, 1976
Thailand Oct. 19, 1988 Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Trinidad and Tobago
Feb. 1984
Tunisia May 7, 1981 Art. 26 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Ukraine
Aug. 14, 1995
Venezuela Sept. 8, 1993 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Vietnam
Mar. 24, 1994
Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Mar. 18, 1974 Art. 27 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Zambia
United Kingdom
April 23, 1996
Ukraine July 1, 2002
Vietnam May 9, 1996 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
MAURITIUS & Oman
Mar. 30, 1998
Art. 27 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…" Aug. 19, 1995 Art. 28 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
Singapore
Sweden
April 23, 1992
Zimbabwe Mar. 6, 1992 Art. 29 "… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary…"
MALAYSIA & United Kingdom
